



County of Allegheny

Office of the Controller

PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
ELECTIONS DIVISION
FOR THE PERIOD
JANUARY 1, 2013 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2015

(Performance Audit)

September 8, 2016

Chelsa Wagner
Controller

104 County Courthouse
436 Grant Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Phone: (412) 350-4660
Fax: (412) 350-4770
E-mail: Controller@alleghenycounty.us

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COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY

OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER

CHELSA WAGNER
CONTROLLER

104 COURTHOUSE • 436 GRANT STREET
PITTSBURGH, PA 15219-2498
PHONE (412) 350-4660 • FAX (412) 350-3006

August 1, 2016

Mr. Jerry Tyskiewicz
Director
Department of Administrative Services
436 Grant Street, Room 202
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

**PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES ELECTIONS DIVISION
FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 2013 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2015**

Dear Mr. Tyskiewicz:

We have conducted a performance audit to evaluate the operations of the Department of Administrative Services Elections Division (Elections Division). Our performance audit covers the period from January 1, 2013 through December 31, 2015, and was performed in accordance with *Government Auditing Standards* issued by the Comptroller General of the United States.


The results of our procedures revealed that the Elections Division does not have a comprehensive set of internal policies and procedures, payments made to Election Officers for attending training exceed the authorized amounts, voting precincts are frequently operating without a full Election Board, there is a lack of documentation relating to agreed upon payments for polling location rentals, and documentation maintained for the elections does not agree to official election results.

The detailed results of our performance audit are included in the attached report.

Mr. Jerry Tyskiewicz
August 1, 2016

We believe that the implementation of our recommendations will help improve the operations of the Elections Division. We would like to thank the management and staff of the Elections Division for their courtesy and cooperation during the performance of our procedures.

Kind regards,



Chelsa Wagner
Controller



Lori A. Churilla
Assistant Deputy Controller, Auditing

cc: Honorable John DeFazio, President, County Council
Honorable Nicholas Futules, Vice-President, County Council
Honorable Rich Fitzgerald, County Executive, Allegheny County
Mr. William D. McKain, County Manager, Allegheny County
Ms. Jennifer M. Liptak, Chief of Staff, County Executive
Ms. Mary C. Soroka, Director, Budget and Finance
Mr. Joe Catanese, Director of Government Relations & Constituent Services, County Council
Mr. Walter Szymanski, Director of Budget and Administration, County Council
Mr. Mark Wolosik, Manager, Elections Division

I. Introduction

The Allegheny County Department of Administrative Services Elections Division (Elections Division) is responsible for overseeing the election process to ensure that all government laws and requirements are upheld. To accomplish its responsibilities, the Elections Division employs approximately 36 full time employees and hires temporary workers as needed during particularly busy periods surrounding the Primary and General elections. The Division is comprised of six departments: voter registration, voting machines, field services (polling places and poll workers), balloting and returns, special ballots and campaign finance, and administration.

Voter Registration

The voter registration department is responsible for processing new voter registrations as well as changes to existing voter registration files. New voter registrations and changes can be received by the Elections Division via paper registration (either through the mail or in person), online registration, or through Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT). In order to register or change their registration, a voter must provide their name, date of birth, and either a driver's license number or the last four digits of their social security number. All voter information is processed by Elections Division employees in the Statewide Uniform Registry of Electors (SURE) database. This database is maintained on a State server but contains Allegheny County voter data.

The voter registration department is able to receive paper applications at any time throughout the year. Online registration applications and changes submitted through the Department of State website are automatically uploaded into the SURE database and the Elections Division is notified within 10 minutes of such an action. New registrations and changes made with PennDOT are uploaded directly into the SURE database from PennDOT. The Elections Division receives electronic batches from PennDOT twice weekly. Any new voter registration application or changes to voter registration received after the registration deadline, which is usually 28-30 days prior to the election, are queued in the SURE database until after the election.

The voter registration department also receives monthly electronic batches from the PA Department of Health alerting the department to all deaths of Allegheny County residents 18 years of age and older. Staff within the department is responsible for reviewing the SURE database to see if the deceased is a registered voter, and if so, marking the voter deceased within the database. Additionally, each summer, the State runs a comparison of the names and addresses of all registered voters in each County against the National Change of Address database maintained by the US Postal Service. Staff within the voter registration department is responsible for mailing out two letters to voters whose address records are deemed to be inconsistent by the State. If the voter does not respond to the original or follow up letter, the voter is then listed as inactive in the SURE database, and will be required to vote by provisional ballot at the next election if his or her status has remained inactive.

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Balloting & Returns and Campaign Finance

Nominating petitions, candidate filings, creation of absentee ballots, and updates and maintenance to the election database (ballots and information specific to each candidate and election are maintained on the Elections Division's Unity system) are handled by the balloting and returns department. The department is responsible for reviewing the number of signatures on nominating petitions and verifying the petitions were properly notarized. All candidates running for political office must also file a Pennsylvania Statement of Financial Interests.

After the last day for filing nomination petitions, the County Board of Elections must select a day for the "Casting of Lots" for the purpose of determining the position of names on the primary ballots. Each candidate for public office and party office is given the opportunity to draw a number to determine his or her position on the primary ballot. The candidate who draws the lower number receives the higher position on the primary ballot. Once ballot position is determined, candidate names and parties are added to the database (Unity system) and a ballot is created. Paper ballots are produced and an electronic ballot is generated. The department also is responsible for mailing an absentee ballot to each candidate asking the candidate to verify the spelling of their name, the office they are running for and their political party.

Campaign finance reports must be filed by candidates for public office detailing information regarding contributions received and expenditures made for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election. A candidate may also authorize a committee to accept contributions and make expenditures on the candidate's behalf. Each candidate and each authorized political committee must file reports of receipts and expenditures, if the amount received or expended or liabilities incurred exceeds \$250. Staff within the Special Ballots and Campaign Finance department is responsible for scanning and indexing all campaign finance reports received. These reports are then uploaded to the County website and are searchable by the public.

Special Ballots

Absentee ballots are used when an individual is unable to attend his or her polling place due to illness or physical disability or when an individual is absent from his or her municipality of residence on the day of election. Completed absentee ballots are required to be returned to the Elections Division prior to 5pm on the Friday before the election. On Election Day, as required by the Pennsylvania Election Code, absentee ballots are opened and hand counted at each precinct. Once counted, absentee ballots are returned to their respective regional center, sorted and taken to the North Side warehouse and then scanned and downloaded onto a floppy disk. The ballots are then uploaded into the election database (Unity system), and added electronically into the final tabulation. Absentee ballots received after the deadline of 5pm on the Friday before the election are time stamped as late and the vote does not count. Voters will receive a letter from the Elections Division stating the ballot cannot be counted and that the individual should apply again for the next election. However, ballots sent in by members of the military are

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accepted and counted up to seven days after Election Day as long as the individual has provided a signed document stating the ballot was mailed no later than 11:59pm on the day before the election.

Provisional ballots are used to record a vote when there is a question regarding the voter's eligibility. When voting via provisional ballot a voter is required to complete and sign the provisional ballot affidavit on the ballot envelope prior to completing the ballot. The affidavit affirms that the voter is registered at the address given and that the provisional ballot is the only ballot he or she has cast in the election. The Election Officer must attest to the reason why the voter is voting via provisional ballot and the Judge of Elections and the Minority Inspector are then required sign off on the envelope prior to the individual voting. Voted provisional ballots are sealed in a secrecy envelope, which is then sealed in the provisional ballot affidavit envelope. The voter must again sign the affidavit envelope when returning the envelope to the Election Officer.

Provisional ballots are not counted on election night. The ballots are reviewed beginning the Friday after the election and a determination is made by the Elections Division to accept, reject or partially accept the ballot. Acceptance or rejection of the ballot is based primarily on the reasons for voting via provisional ballot. One of the main reasons for a provisional ballot being rejected is due to the individual not being a registered voter. Ballots are partially accepted when a voter who is registered in District A is voting in District B. Votes for District B candidates cannot be counted as the voter is registered in District A. Only votes for overlapping candidates for District A and B can be counted, thus the ballot is partially accepted. Responses to ballot questions are always accepted regardless of the district, unless the voter is not a registered voter. Similar to the absentee process, accepted and partially accepted provisional ballots are then scanned and uploaded into the North Side database and added to the final tabulation.

Field Services (Polling Locations) and Voting Machines

Currently there are 1,319 voting districts (or precincts) and 850 polling locations located within Allegheny County. The Pennsylvania Election Code requires polling locations to be located within the boundaries of a voter's voting district or an adjacent district. Each polling location must have at least two voting machines, as one is specifically designed as a handicap accessible machine. Additional machines may be assigned based on the number of voters in the precinct. We were also informed by the Elections Division Manager that all buildings serving as polling locations within Allegheny County are handicap accessible.

In the weeks leading up to an election, all voting machines are checked for damages and repaired as necessary. All machines are recalibrated and the internal clocks on the machines are reset. Voting machines are not precinct specific. Prior to each election the Elections Division loads specific precinct information onto the personalized electronic ballot (PEB) cartridges for each precinct. The use of these PEB cartridges is what then makes a voting machine precinct specific. Each machine is also equipped with an

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internal flash card that contains all ballots for all precincts within Allegheny County. Logic and Accuracy (L&A) testing is performed by the Allegheny County Division of Computer Services on all machines to be used in the upcoming election to ensure that the PEB cartridges, flash cards and voting machines are in working order. The Elections Division also conducts its own Logic and Accuracy testing on a sample of absentee and emergency ballots. All PEB cartridges used as part of the L&A testing are then cleared and checked to ensure the vote count is zero. Prior to testing, the Elections Division gives notice to various political groups to allow for observation of the L&A process. In addition, the Division also employs an outside Certified Public Accounting firm to perform parallel testing on Election Day for each election cycle. Parallel testing is a process that tests voting machines by first generating an independent set of ballot results (predefined script). The results are then compared to the results produced by the voting machine to ensure votes are being tallied correctly and the machines are operating properly.

The Pennsylvania Election Code requires polls to be open from 7am to 8pm on Election Day. Each polling location should be manned with a full Election Board to include a Judge of Elections, Majority Inspector, Minority Inspector, Machine Inspector and Minority Inspector's Clerk. With the exception of the Machine Inspector or Clerk, all positions require the individual to be at least 18 years of age and registered to vote in Allegheny County. It is the responsibility of the Election Board to ensure that voters are able to successfully cast their ballots on Election Day. The Elections Division also assigns approximately 177 individuals (120 of them employees from other Allegheny County departments) to various precincts throughout Allegheny County on Election Day to check-in with Election Boards to ensure the polling locations are properly set up and to help if members of the Board require any technical assistance.

After the close of the polls, the Judge of Elections is responsible for bringing the election materials to one of seven regional centers. The seven regional centers are scattered throughout Allegheny County and are located at: Holy Family Institute-Emsworth, Obama Academy, County Office Building, Kane Regional Center-Scott, Springdale, Turtle Creek Municipal Building, and Kane Regional Center-Ross. Materials include all absentee, provisional and emergency ballots, supervisor and master PEB cartridges, machine flash cards, numbered lists of voters, and stationary supplies.

Vote Reconciliation

Each voting district has a master PEB cartridge that collects all votes cast from all machines in that district and is brought back to one of the regional centers with the aforementioned materials. A cartridge reader connects through a telephone/modem landline where the data is then sent from the regional center to Elections Central at the Elections warehouse located on the North Side. Master PEBs from each district are re-read at the warehouse to determine the official tabulation database (performed through the Unity system). The flash cards from each machine are also re-read at the warehouse to ensure the preliminary results received on election night are accurate. Differences in tabulations between election night and the day after the election may occur when the

I. Introduction

Election Officers use different PEBs to open and close the machines rather than using the same master PEB to open and close each machine for that district. In such instances, the Elections Division performs a reconciliation with all the PEBs from the district to what was reported on election night to ensure the final vote count is accurate.

Election Costs

The table on the following page presents the Elections Division costs broken out by annual/general costs of the Division as well as costs relating to the Primary and General elections for each year of our engagement period, as provided by the Allegheny County Department of Administrative Services. A brief explanation of some of the costs is provided below. The descriptions provided are general overviews, and may not list all specific costs include in each category.

Personnel costs include salaries, overtime, sick pay-buyback, and health benefit bonus.

Fringe Benefit costs include pension, FICA & Medicare, health and dental insurance, and workers compensation.

Services include phone, postage, training & education, travel, contracted services (payments for temporary staff), real estate rentals (polling location payments), equipment rentals, Election Officer payments, Election Constable payments, freight and services (rental costs for North Shore warehouse), advertising, and printing.

Supplies include election supplies (miscellaneous small dollar purchases), and office supplies.

Other costs include

- **Construction & Maintenance** - electrical services and other construction materials
- **Repair & Maintenance** - computer server & software maintenance costs, vehicle repair
- **Non Tagged Fixed Assets** - laptops and computer towers

Capital costs include firmware usage agreements and software maintenance agreements for the voting machines.

Overall, Elections Division costs increased approximately \$93,000 or 2% from 2013 to 2014, and \$29,000 or 1% from 2014 to 2015. Based on the records reviewed, these variances appear reasonable. Larger variances are seen between categories from year to year due to changes in the classification of expenses as operating versus capital.

I. Introduction

Summary of Elections Costs for 2013, 2014, and 2015

Annual Costs

<u>Category</u>	<u>2013</u>	<u>2014</u>	<u>2015</u>
Operating			
Personnel	\$ 1,335,875	\$ 1,398,564	\$ 1,372,382
Fringe Benefits	660,606	642,835	636,743
Services	378,123	368,956	375,246
Supplies	39,058	44,636	40,319
Other	1,366	1,807	7,984
Subtotal Operating	\$ 2,415,028	\$ 2,456,798	\$ 2,432,674
Capital Costs	\$ 65,467	\$ 184,495	\$ 168,075
Total Annual Costs	\$ 2,480,495	\$ 2,641,293	\$ 2,600,749

Primary Election Costs

<u>Category</u>	<u>2013</u>	<u>2014</u>	<u>2015</u>
Operating			
Services	\$ 1,467,631	\$ 1,396,407	\$ 1,436,996
Supplies	-	2,515	-
Other	-	200	-
Subtotal Operating	\$ 1,467,631	\$ 1,399,122	\$ 1,436,996
Capital Costs	-	\$ 18,181	-
Total Primary Costs	\$ 1,467,631	\$ 1,417,303	\$ 1,436,996

General Election Costs

<u>Category</u>	<u>2013</u>	<u>2014</u>	<u>2015</u>
Operating			
Services	\$ 1,314,427	\$ 1,389,476	\$ 1,440,080
Supplies	-	318	-
Other	-	621	-
Subtotal Operating	\$ 1,314,427	\$ 1,390,415	\$ 1,440,080
Capital Costs	\$ 93,502	-	-
Total General Costs	\$ 1,407,929	\$ 1,390,415	\$ 1,440,080

YEARLY TOTALS

	<u>2013</u>	<u>2014</u>	<u>2015</u>
Operating	\$ 5,197,086	\$ 5,246,335	\$ 5,309,750
Capital	158,969	202,676	168,075
TOTAL	\$ 5,356,055	\$ 5,449,011	\$ 5,477,825

II. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Objectives

Our objectives were to:

- Gain an understanding of the operations of the Elections Division to ensure it is operating efficiently and effectively. Also, to review applicable laws, regulations and other official guidance.
- Examine and perform an analytical review of election cost and personnel data.
- Ensure the accuracy of voting equipment and software, and assess the condition and inventory of equipment.
- Perform analysis of voter registration, ballots cast, and other pertinent information.
- Apply procedures to determine that only qualified voters were permitted to vote.
 - Reconcile the number of voter check-ins to the number of votes cast on the voting machines in a sample of precincts.
 - Check names of a sample of voters to incarceration lists and obituaries.
 - Review the address of a sample of voters to ensure they are residents of the district they are voting in.
- Apply procedures to determine that absentee and provisional ballots are properly utilized, and properly accepted or rejected.
- Determine whether payments made to poll workers and polling locations were accurate and properly supported.
- Determine if poll workers are properly trained and assess the number of vacancies on election boards and review the procedures for those filling vacancies.
- Review polling locations for handicap accessibility as well as determine if polling locations can be consolidated. Also, to determine if private residences are being used as polling places.
- Determine if the allocation and deployment of Election Day equipment and supplies were adequate and equitable.

Scope

Our audit procedures covered the period January 1, 2013 through December 31, 2015. We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

II. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Methodology

Methodologies used to accomplish our objectives included, but were not limited to the following:

- Reviewed the Pennsylvania Election Code, the Allegheny County Administrative Code, and various internal documents provided by the Elections Division.
- Interviewed Elections Division personnel to gain an understanding of the processes surrounding:
 - Preparation for and responsibilities on Election Day
 - New voter registration and changes to registration
 - Utilization of the SURE database
 - Various methods of voting
 - Selection of polling locations
 - Responsibilities of Election Officers, and
 - Post-election procedures, to include certification of election results
- Performed a cost variance analysis on elections costs as provided by the Allegheny County Department of Administrative Services.
- Reviewed multiple external reports relating to the maintenance and accuracy of voting machines.
- Reviewed Board of Elections board minutes for the meetings held within our engagement period.
- Analyzed data provided by the Elections Division to determine if votes are being tabulated and reported correctly.
- Tested a sample of absentee, emergency, and provisional ballots and “at the polls” votes to reconcile official vote tabulation results with supporting documentation.
- Examined a sample of deceased voters to ensure they were properly removed from the Election rolls.
- Reviewed a sample of active voters who have not voted for at least ten years to ensure that their active voting status is appropriate.
- Examined a sample of voters that were removed from the Election rolls between the primary and general election in 2015 to determine if there was a valid reason that they were removed.
- Compared the individuals recorded as voting in the SURE database to a list of individuals incarcerated at the Allegheny County Jail on each Election Day during our engagement period.
- Reviewed payment information for a sample of poll workers, including payments for training attendance and completion of Election Day duties.
- Reviewed payment information for a sample of polling locations.
- Documented private residences used as polling locations in Allegheny County and if these locations are considered to be handicap accessible.
- Tested a sample of individuals to verify their residence and polling location were located in the same or adjacent voting districts.
- Calculated the number of voting machines required as per the PA Election Code for a sample of voting precincts to ensure the Elections Division is distributing an appropriate number of machines.

II. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

- Reviewed written complaints made to the Elections Division to determine if a voter's ability to vote was hindered, and if the Division researches and follows up on complaints.

In some cases, samples selected were not statistically relevant. However, we believe they are sufficient to identify findings related to the population. Our audit also included an assessment of internal controls that are significant within the context of our objectives. Any significant findings related to internal control are included in the findings and recommendations.

We provided a draft copy of this report to the Director of Administrative Services for response. The response begins on page 29.

III. Findings and Recommendations

Finding #1:

Inconsistencies Found When Comparing Voting Results to Supporting Documentation

Criteria:

The Pennsylvania Election Code sets forth the laws and regulations required to be followed by the County Boards of Elections (Elections Division) relating to general, municipal, special and primary elections, the nomination of candidates, and primary and general election expenses.

Various sections of the Code reference that all applications and materials used in the tabulation of official voting results be retained by the County Board of Elections.

Condition:

We reviewed documentation maintained by the Elections Division related to the samples we selected for the various voting methods as outlined below. For the 2013 General Election, there were 1,318 precincts in Allegheny County. An additional precinct was added prior to the 2014 Primary Election. From 2014 forward, there were 1,319 precincts.

Absentee Ballots

A voter can request an absentee ballot application if he is unable to attend his polling location due to illness or physical disability; is absent from his municipality of residence on the day of the election; or is not attending his polling location on the day of the election due to the observance of a religious holiday.

We selected a sample of 125 voting precincts, 25 each for the 2013 General Election and the 2014 and 2015 Primary and General Elections, and agreed the official election results to the supporting documentation. We selected our sample items haphazardly to ensure that our sample was representative of the population so that our testing results could be projected to the population. We could not review documentation from the 2013 Primary Election as the Elections Division has not retained these records. According to the Pennsylvania Elections Code, the required retention period for documentation of the 2013 Primary Election had passed. A total of 503 absentee ballots were returned for the 125 voting precincts tested.

We reviewed all absentee ballot applications as maintained within the precinct envelopes and found 1 of 503 applications was unable to be located. Of the 502 absentee ballot applications reviewed, 3 were not signed by the applicant, but were processed by the Elections Division anyway. We were informed by Elections

III. Findings and Recommendations

Division personnel that processing the application without a signature was an oversight on the part of the Division.

Our testing also revealed 6 of 125 precincts (5%) in which the number of absentee ballots returned per the supporting documentation contained in the precinct envelope did not agree to the official election results for that precinct.

- For 3 of the 6 precincts (50%), the number of absentee ballots returned with the supporting documentation in the precinct envelope was greater than the number of absentee ballots cast per the official election results for that precinct.
 - The supporting documentation for each of these three precincts contained one additional absentee ballot than was reported in the official election results.
 - For 1 of these 3 precincts, the voter received and completed an absentee ballot for the wrong precinct. The results for this ballot were included in the official results for the precinct listed on the actual ballot, but the physical ballot was included in the precinct envelope where the voter was registered.
- For the remaining 3 of 6 precincts (50%), the official election results for each precinct showed more absentee votes cast for that precinct than could be supported by the documentation maintained within the precinct envelope.

We also found 1 additional precinct (1%) in which the number of ballots returned in the precinct envelope (4) agreed to the official election results for that precinct (4 absentee votes) but all other documentation contained within the precinct envelope indicated that 9 ballots were actually returned for this precinct.

We were informed by Elections Division personnel that it is possible that the missing ballots were misfiled in a different precinct envelope, or that the voter received an absentee ballot for a precinct other than which he or she was registered in. Per discussion with Elections Division personnel, unless the voter notifies the Division that he or she received an incorrect ballot, Elections would have no way of knowing the incorrect ballot was mailed out. Elections personnel also stated that usually the voter simply completes the ballot and mails it back without checking to ensure the voting precinct is correct. However, it seems reasonable for the voter to be reliant on the Elections Division to ensure that he or she is mailed the proper absentee ballot without needing to review the ballot before voting.

III. Findings and Recommendations

Provisional Ballots

Provisional ballots are used to record a vote when there is a question regarding the voter's eligibility. Usually a provisional ballot is utilized due to the voter attempting to vote in a district other than the one he or she is registered in. In such cases, the voter is given a provisional ballot for the district he or she is voting in. When the ballot is returned to the Elections Division it is reviewed by Elections Division personnel and like offices (offices that are the same on both ballots) are manually transcribed from the ballot for the precinct where they are voting onto a ballot for the precinct the voter is registered in. Only votes for the like offices are counted in the district the voter is registered in. All other votes for offices in the district where the voter cast his or her ballot are not counted.

We selected a sample of 15 voting precincts in which at least one provisional ballot was counted. We selected our sample items haphazardly to ensure that our sample was representative of the population so that our testing results could be projected to the population. In total we reviewed 18 provisional ballots, as one sampled precinct had three provisional ballots counted and another had 2 provisional ballots counted; the remaining precincts all had one provisional ballot counted.

Of the 18 provisional ballots cast, the Elections Division was unable to provide us with 5 (28%) voted ballots (the original ballot completed by the voter at the polling location). Without being able to review the voted ballots, we were unable to determine if the votes were properly transcribed and counted in the voter's registered district.

For the 13 provisional ballots for which we had a voted ballot and a transcribed ballot, we found 3 (23%) which were not properly transcribed by Elections Division personnel.

- Due to the ballots being transcribed improperly, an individual running for office did not receive credit for the vote on two ballots.
 - On one of these two ballots, the opposing candidate actually received credit for the vote.
- When reviewing the remaining ballot, we found that two candidates for different offices each received a vote even though the voter did not vote for them originally.

III. Findings and Recommendations

Emergency Ballots

Emergency ballots are utilized when more than 50% of the voting machines at the precinct are considered to be inoperable, normally due to a technical difficulty opening the machines and/or keeping them running throughout the day. We selected a sample of 15 voting precincts in which at least one emergency ballot was cast. We selected our sample items haphazardly to ensure that our sample was representative of the population so that our testing results could be projected to the population. In total, between the 15 precincts sampled, 65 emergency ballots were cast.

We noted no issues when comparing the number of emergency ballots returned per the precinct envelopes to the number of emergency ballots counted in the official results for that precinct. However, of the 15 precincts reviewed, we found 8 precincts (53%) in which review of the printed machines tapes revealed that the machines for those precincts were not open until after 7am. The Pennsylvania Election Code requires polling places to be open and operational from 7am until 8pm on Election Day. We found that on average the machines were opened approximately 32 minutes late, with the latest machine opened at 8:05am. All machines appeared to be open until at least 8pm. We reviewed documentation maintained in the precinct envelopes and noted the following:

- For three of these precincts, the polling location was inaccessible to the Election Officers until after 7am.
- For one precinct the Judge of Elections overslept, and the machines could not be opened until he arrived at the polling location.
- No reason was given as to why the other 4 precincts were not opened at the required time.

During our review of the emergency ballots, we also found an instance where the Judge of Elections opened the voting machines for two different precincts (both located in the same polling location) with the same master PEB. This would cause all of the votes for both districts to be counted under one district. In this case, we reviewed the official election results noting the only difference in offices up for election between the two districts was for a Judge of Elections, who ran unopposed. However, voters and candidates may question the results of an election when they realize voters were permitted to vote in the wrong precinct.

As part of other testing, we compared the number of votes recorded in the electronic voter history files, which includes all voters who were registered to vote during an election and the voter

III. Findings and Recommendations

history applied from the immediately preceding election, to the official number of votes for that precinct. We also agreed the vote count to the actual number of voter certificates for numerous precincts. During this process, we found that six emergency ballots in one precinct were not counted in the official number of votes for that precinct even though the voter received credit for voting.

Cause:

It appears most of the findings noted above occurred due to clerical error on the part of the Election Officers, Election Division personnel, or both. These errors may be representative of the Election Division's need to hire qualified and skilled individuals to serve as Election Officers on Election Day. Also with some precincts consistently operating with an understaffed Elections Board, the responsibility of performing the job of two or three Election Officers may now fall on only one Election Officer.

Additionally, due to the volume of ballots required to be processed by Elections Division personnel, it is possible that such personnel may not take as much time as needed when mailing the absentee ballot to voters, properly transcribing provisional ballots, or ensuring that precinct envelopes are complete and contain all required documentation, thus resulting in incorrect absentee and provisional votes being counted and incomplete precinct envelopes. The Elections Division does not have sufficient internal controls to ensure errors in these areas are corrected in a timely manner.

Regarding emergency ballots, as noted in the *Allegheny County Elections Division Election Officer Reference Manual*, it is the responsibility of the Election Officers to notify the Elections Division of any problems on Election Day. If a polling location is inaccessible at the time the polls are required to be open, the Election Officers are required to inform the Elections Division of such issues. If the Election Officers do not notify the Division of any such problems, the Elections Division cannot remedy the situation if the Division is unaware a problem exists.

Effect:

Accurate recording and retention of records is necessary to ensure that election results are accurate and can be proven accurate if such results are questioned. Misfiled or misplaced documents can compromise the integrity of an election. In addition, the mailing of incorrect absentee ballots and the inaccurate transcription of provisional ballots can result in votes being counted for offices which the voter did not intend to cast his or her vote. The proper mailing of absentee ballots and transcription of provisional ballots

III. Findings and Recommendations

is especially important in smaller municipal elections when one vote can sometimes determine the outcome of the race.

Voters may also be turned off to the idea of not being able to vote on a voting machine on Election Day. These voters may decide that they do not wish to vote via an emergency ballot or may state they will return to the polling location at a later time, but then may decide against it. We also noted an instance when the emergency votes were not counted in the official vote total for the precinct. The Elections Division pays each private polling location an agreed upon stipend for use of the facility on Election Day. If the facility is not accessible at the required times, the Elections Division is essentially paying for services it did not receive.

Recommendations: The Controller's Office recommends that the Elections Division:

- Take the necessary steps to ensure that Election Officers are properly trained as to the duties and requirements of their job.
- Consider additional Election Officer recruitment methods such as newspaper ads or radio commercials in an attempt to fully staff all precincts on Election Day.
- Ensure that Elections Division personnel are trained on how to properly transcribe provisional ballots.
- Remind Election Officers of their duty to report any problems to the Elections Division if and when they arise.

**Management's
Response:**

The response begins on page 29 of this report.

**Controller's Office
Comments:**

See comments at Finding #2 related to Election Officer training on page 22 of this report.

III. Findings and Recommendations

Finding #2:**Election Officers Received Additional Compensation Totaling \$82,660 for Attending Training Sessions****Criteria:**

Each voting precinct should be manned with a full Election Board to include a Judge of Elections, Majority Inspector, Minority Inspector, Machine Inspector and Minority Inspector's Clerk. Each Election Officer is tasked with a specific responsibility and should be present at the polling location for the entire Election Day to ensure the election process is running as designed.

Approximately two months prior to each election, the Elections Division mails a training notice to all Election Officers. The notice details dates, times and locations of all upcoming mandatory and optional trainings offered prior to the election. Election Officers are required to attend one, mandatory, two hour training session at least once during each four year term of office, with the most recently completed full term running from 2010 through 2013 and the current term beginning in 2014 and running through 2017. The mandatory training is required for all new Election Officers or any Election Officer who has not yet received training during the four year term. The training includes the basics on how to set up and run the polling location. Each attendee receives \$20 compensation for completing the entire two hour training session, and per the notice sent to all Election Officers, compensation shall only be awarded only once during the four year term. Two optional "refresher" trainings are also offered to all Election Officers. Individuals who attend these refresher trainings are awarded no compensation.

Condition:

We reviewed all payments in the County's accounting system made to training attendees during the periods 2010-2013 and 2014-2015. For the four year term running 2010 through 2013, we found 3,049 attendees who were overpaid at least \$20 for a total overpayment amount of \$79,460. The following table provides a breakdown of the 3,049 overpaid training attendees:

Overpayment Amount	# of Training Attendees	Total Overpayment Amount
\$ 20	2,362	\$ 47,240
\$ 40	511	\$ 20,440
\$ 60	136	\$ 8,160
\$ 80	27	\$ 2,160
\$ 100	7	\$ 700
\$ 120	4	\$ 480
\$ 140	2	\$ 280
Total	3,049	\$ 79,460

III. Findings and Recommendations

For the two year period beginning January 1, 2014 and ending December 31, 2015 (end of our engagement period) we found 142 training attendees who were overpaid at least \$20 for a total overpayment amount of \$3,200. The following table provides a breakdown of the 142 overpaid training attendees:

Overpayment Amount	# of Training Attendees	Total Overpayment Amount
\$ 20	125	\$ 2,500
\$ 40	16	\$ 640
\$ 60	1	\$ 60
Total	142	\$ 3,200

While it appears from review of the charts above that many Election Officers and potential Officers are attending training multiple times, we learned through discussions with Elections Division personnel that not all voting precincts are staffed with a full Election Board. In many instances, the Elections Division has trouble staffing the Board from the very beginning. Phone calls are made and emails are sent to any and all individuals who expressed an interest in the process, often times with no response. In other instances, a full Election Board is secured prior to the Election but often Election Officers are unable to attend to their duties on Election Day and give little to no warning to the Elections Division. Elections Division personnel stated that if an Election Officer calls the day before stating he or she cannot make it to the precinct on Election Day, all resources are exhausted in an attempt to secure a replacement. However, often times an Election Officer simply does not show up at the precinct on Election Day and by that time, there is no opportunity for the Elections Division to try to secure another Officer.

Cause:

We inquired of the Elections Division as to why individuals were receiving multiple payments during the same four year term for attending training sessions when the notice sent to all Election Officers clearly states that \$20 compensation will be paid for completing the mandatory two hour training only once during the four year term. Elections Division personnel made reference to the fact that the computer system used for tracking Election Officers is outdated and that manually checking for repeat attendees would be too time consuming. We were informed that when the sign-in sheets are returned to the Elections Division from the training sites, Election Division personnel simply forward the sheets to the Controller's Office Accounting Division to initiate the payment process. The Elections Division does not have sufficient internal controls in place to monitor the payment limit set by the Division. While we were also informed that the individual in the Controller's

III. Findings and Recommendations

Office who processes Election payments is aware that training attendees should only be compensated once during each four year term, we believe it is not the Controller's Office responsibility to review sign-in sheets for repeat attendees just because the Elections Division believes the process to be too time consuming to complete on their own.

Additionally, multiple employees within the Elections Division stated to us during the performance of our procedures that they didn't believe it to be fair to "fault" individuals for attending multiple training sessions during the four year term. While we also agree that individuals should attend as many training sessions as they deem personally necessary, these individuals should only be compensated once in the four year term based on the Elections Division policies.

The Elections Division uses the same outdated and insufficient system to track training attendance as it does to track Election Officer coverage at voting precincts on Election Day. Approximately three to four Elections Division personnel are assigned to fill Election Boards for all voting precincts within Allegheny County. While precincts can share a polling location, each precinct is required to have its own Election Board. Three-ring binders are used to track coverage of each voting precinct because the computer system utilized by the Elections Division does not have the capability to track coverage in a way that isn't too time-consuming for Elections Division personnel. Calls are placed and emails are sent daily to current and former members of the Election Board and to volunteers in an attempt to secure a full Election Board. However, with the exception of the Judge of Elections, there are no repercussions for any of the other Election Officers who do not show up to fulfill their duties on Election Day. Since there are no repercussions for the Election Board, it is difficult to implement internal controls over these positions.

Effect:

For the four year term running 2010 through 2013, we found 3,049 training attendees who were overpaid at least once for a total overpayment amount of \$79,460. During the first two years (2014 and 2015) of the current four year term we found 142 training attendees who were overpaid at least once for a total overpayment amount of \$3,200. For the six years reviewed, training attendees were overcompensated a total of \$82,660. Instead of being inappropriately awarded to training attendees, this money could have been used to help pay for a variety of needs within the Division, including a new computer system designed to appropriately track training attendance and Election Officer vacancies.

III. Findings and Recommendations

Additionally, without a full Election Board present at each voting precinct, any unforeseen problems that may arise could go undetected due to the limited availability of an already short staffed Election Board. Also, if a last minute replacement is found for an Election Officer who cannot make it on Election Day, this replacement may not be trained on how to work the machines or assist voters with the election process. An untrained Election Officer increases the risk of Election Day errors.

Recommendations: The Controller's Office recommends that the Elections Division:

- Reiterate to any individual calling to schedule attendance for a training that he or she will not receive any additional compensation if he or she has already been compensated previously in the four year term.
- Search for individuals within the system when the individual calls to schedule attendance for a training. By looking up individuals in the system as they call, Elections personnel can avoid overloading the system and can still check to see if the caller has previously attended training.
- Perform a reconciliation of the training attendance sheets to the list of names in the County's accounting system who have already received compensation for previously attending training during the four year term. The Elections Division should take responsibility for ensuring that training attendees are not compensated more than once in a four year term.
- Inform the Election Officers of their responsibility to the voters and their voting precinct on Election Day, and implement a contingency plan for precincts in which Election Officers do not show up.
- Implement an electronic record keeping system (i.e. an Excel spreadsheet or an Access database) to track the names of all poll workers, as well as their contact information, for every precinct. Although historic information on the poll workers should be maintained, the system should be continually updated as poll workers are added or resign. This will enable the Elections Division to assess the adequacy of staffing for each precinct and allow the Elections Division to request that resources from overstaffed precincts be reallocated to precincts that are severely understaffed.

III. Findings and Recommendations

- Consider changing its policy to allow for individuals who attend training sessions more than once in the four year term to receive compensation for each session he or she attends.

Management's
Response:

The response begins on page 29 of this report.

Controller's Office
Comments:

The information regarding the mandatory training Voter ID training was not disclosed to the auditors during the course of the audit. Rather, Elections Division representatives stated that they are aware of individuals who are compensated for attending multiple training sessions and that manually checking for repeat attendees is too time consuming.

We further reviewed payments made to training attendees for the four year term running 2010 through 2013 and found that approximately \$50,500 of the \$82,660 originally identified as overpayment is compensation for attending the mandatory Voter ID training. The remaining \$32,160 is still considered to be overpayments made in error.

III. Findings and Recommendations

Finding #3: Payments Made to Polling Locations Lack Supporting Documentation

- Criteria: The Elections Division should develop an agreement designed to document the agreed upon payment amount for the use of the facility as a polling location during the primary and/or general election. This agreement should include the polling location address, payment amount and the dates and times of use. A written agreement will ensure that both parties have a clear understanding of the terms of use of the facility as well as the agreed upon payment amount.
- Condition: We reviewed a sample of 75 payments made to polling locations for the six elections held during our engagement period. We selected our sample items using a random number generator to ensure that our sample was representative of the population so that our testing results could be projected to the population. For our sample of 75 we noted payments to polling locations ranging from \$10 to \$225, with an average payment of approximately \$87. When we inquired of Elections Division personnel if any agreements or contracts were in place between Elections and the polling location related to the payment for use of the facility, we were informed that only verbal agreements are made between the Elections Field Services Manager and the individual in charge of the facility. Without a written agreement, a polling location can argue that the amount paid to the facility was not the amount agreed upon. It is important to note however that unless a polling location informs the Elections Division that the facility can no longer accommodate voters, the Field Service Manager tries to maintain a relationship with the polling location year after year to ensure consistency for the voter. In such cases, the Elections Division and/or Allegheny County have payment history records available in the County's accounting system to prove the amount of payment has been consistent throughout the years.
- The Elections Field Service Manager informed us that he completes a spreadsheet detailing all polling locations and the amount paid to each location for each election. However, when we requested to review these spreadsheets, we were informed that they are completed in real time and no historical data exists, other than payment records in the County's accounting system.
- Cause: We were informed by Elections Division personnel that verbal agreements between Elections and the polling location regarding the terms of use of the facility and the agreed upon payment amount have always been the standard procedure. There are not sufficient controls in place to ensure supporting documentation or

III. Findings and Recommendations

written agreements are maintained to substantiate payments made to polling locations.

Effect: During the performance of our procedures, the Controller's Office received an email from an individual associated with a facility used as a polling location alleging that the facility was underpaid \$400 for its use on General Election Day 2014. While we were able to ascertain that the facility was never paid the amount the individual was claiming was due to the facility, it proves the point that disagreements can arise without any type of written agreement detailing the exact terms of use of the facility as well as the payment amount. It should be noted that the individual also suggested to the Controller's Office that Allegheny County should enter into a lease agreement with polling locations to alleviate any future disagreements.

Recommendation: The Controller's Office recommends that the Elections Division:

- Create a uniform agreement that can be used for all polling locations in Allegheny County detailing terms of use of the facility as well as the agreed upon payment amount. The agreement should be designed to have blank spaces allowing Elections personnel to fill in the specific information for each polling location. Agreements should be signed by the facility representative and by an appropriate Elections Division employee. A copy of the agreements should also be maintained by the Elections Division.

Management's

Response:

The response begins on page 29 of this report.

Controller's Office

Comments:

Implementing our recommendation to create a uniform agreement that can be used for all polling locations in Allegheny County detailing the terms of use of the facility as well as the agreed upon payment amount may eliminate any potential issues from arising during future elections.

III. Findings and Recommendations

Finding #4: The Elections Division Lacks Comprehensive Policies and Procedures

- Criteria: A comprehensive set of policies and procedures should be available for reference by Elections Division personnel when needed. All new employees should be given a copy of all applicable policies and procedures prior to beginning their new job. An effective set of policies and procedures should identify job titles, provide job descriptions that detail duties and responsibilities for each position, and outline the operational procedures of the Division.
- Condition: During our engagement we requested copies of the Election Division's policies and procedures as applicable to full-time and temporary employees of the Election Division (operational procedures) as well as policies and procedures applicable to Election Officers (poll workers). In response to our request, the Elections Division provided us with the *Allegheny County Elections Division Election Officer Reference Manual*. We reviewed the Manual noting it provides Election Officers with information necessary to allow them to perform their duties at the polls. It includes such topics as: opening procedures for polling locations, processing voters, voters with specific needs, and polling location closing procedures.
- We were also given access to the Job Aids maintained in the Statewide Uniform Registry of Electors (SURE) database. We reviewed the Job Aids for various topics such as: processing online voter registration applications, absentee and provisional ballot processing, Pennsylvania duplicate voter notice process, five year mailing process, and the National Change of Address mailing process, among others. The Job Aids essentially provide the operator (Elections Division personnel) with step by step instructions on how to process various voter related issues within the SURE database.
- While the Election Officer Reference Manual and the SURE Job Aids appeared well written and complete, comprehensive policies and procedures related to the operations of the Elections Division were not provided.
- Cause: The Elections Division was unable to provide us with comprehensive operational policies and procedures. Without clear, written, and current procedures, an internal control structure is weaker because practices, controls, guidelines, and processes may not be applied consistently, correctly, and uniformly throughout the Department.

III. Findings and Recommendations

Effect: Without a comprehensive set of operational policies and procedures, employees of the Elections Division may have trouble understanding their roles and responsibilities within predefined limits. In turn, this makes the administration's task of ensuring effective and efficient operations that much harder.

Recommendations: The Controller's Office recommends that the Elections Division:

- Compile a comprehensive set of policies and procedures and distribute those policies and procedures to all new and current employees.
- Review policies and procedures on an at least an annual basis to ensure that current policies and procedures are effective and are followed by Division employees.

Management's
Response: The response begins on page 29 of this report.

IV. Conclusion

The Allegheny County Department of Administrative Services Elections Division (Elections Division) is responsible for overseeing the election process to ensure that all government laws and requirements are upheld. For 2013 through 2015 the yearly costs ranged from \$5.4 million to \$5.5 million, with less than a 2% overall variances from year to year. However, we identified several areas where the operations of the Elections Division need improvement. Specifically we found the following:

- Documentation maintained for the elections does not agree to official election results. For instance clerical errors have led to:
 - Misfiled or missing records.
 - Variances in the number of absentee ballots filed compared to the number of ballots cast per the official election results.
 - Inaccurate transcription of provisional ballots.
- Voting machines not being opened in accordance with the Pennsylvania Elections Code.
- Election Officer training attendees were overpaid \$82,660.
- Election Boards are understaffed.
- Agreements are not utilized when securing and paying for polling place locations for use on Election Day.
- The Elections Division lacks comprehensive policies and procedures which would provide operational procedures and internal controls for the Division.

The results of our audit procedures support the recommendations made throughout this report. The Elections Division needs to implement additional procedures and changes in several areas in order to help ensure that the elections process is as fair and transparent as possible.

Management's

Response:

The response begins on page 29 of this report.

Controller's Office

Comments:

Based on our review of the Director of Administrative Services' conclusion, it appears the 3.065 million documents the Director is referencing possibly relate to the number of documents printed for each election, not the number of documents actually utilized during each election. We prepared a table below of the number of absentee, provisional, and emergency ballots cast during each election in our audit period from information provided by the Elections Division during the course of our audit.

IV. Conclusion

Controller's Office
Comments continued:

Election	Number of Ballots Cast by Election & Type			
	Absentee	Provisional	Emergency	Total
2013 Primary	3,632	75	9	3,716
2013 General	3,766	81	10	3,857
2014 Primary	2,944	80	7	3,031
2014 General	8,919	393	110	9,422
2015 Primary	2,727	81	20	2,828
2015 General	4,195	123	77	4,395
Total	26,183	833	233	27,249
Average per Election	4,364	139	39	4,542

The 27,249 absentee, provisional and emergency ballots cast during the three election years in our audit period is less than 1% of the number of forms the Director of Administrative Services projects to be used in three typical election years.

Additionally, while the County averaged 870,712 registered voters for each election during our audit period, an average of only 202,462 voters actually cast a ballot. Thus, while the Elections Division may have printed an average of 871,000 voter certificates for each election, only 202,000 on average were utilized. Similarly, while the district registers contain a listing of every resident registered to vote in that district, poll workers are only using it as a reference tool for voters who actually show up to vote. We do understand that the poll workers are required to complete various other forms on Election Day. However, the number of forms is minimal when compared to the numbers presented by the Director of Administrative Services in his response.

In accordance with Government Auditing Standards we performed our testwork on a sample basis. We haphazardly selected our sample items from the ballots cast to ensure that our sample was representative of the population so that our testing results could be projected to the population. As such, the results of our testing detailed in Finding #1 can be extrapolated over the 27,249 absentee, provisional and emergency ballots cast during the three election years in our audit period.



August 29, 2016

Honorable Chelsa Wagner
Office of the County Controller
436 Grant Street
Room 104 Courthouse
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

RE: Response to Controller's "Performance Audit of the Department of Administrative Services Elections Division for the Period January 1, 2013 through December 31, 2015"

Dear Controller Wagner:

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the above referenced Performance Audit of the Elections Division for the period January 1, 2013 through December 31, 2015.

While I remain appreciative of the audit, I will address the recommendations your report suggests.

Finding #1 - Inconsistencies Found When Comparing Voting Results to Supporting Documentation

The common denominator in the recommendations speaks mostly to Election Officer recruitment, training and policy and procedures.

- Currently Election Officers receive paid training once every four years. However, they are welcome to attend supplemental training annually without compensation. Occasionally extenuating circumstances occur such as Presidential Elections and changes to the Election Law which require augmentation to the training schedule which may be paid or unpaid.
- During the course of this audit the Department of Elections has a dedicated page on the County web-site seeking volunteers. www.allegenycounty.com. The response to date has been robust. The Department of Administrative Services division of Special Events will begin advertising in the next month with print, radio and targeted bus advertisements.
- Transcribing Provisional Ballots are part of the Election Board training.
- Election Officers are provided information prior to Election Day and on Election Day the proper protocol to report any problems.

JERRY TYSKIEWICZ, DIRECTOR

DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

202 COURTHOUSE • 436 GRANT STREET • PITTSBURGH, PA 15219
PHONE (412) 350-6109 • FAX (412) 350-4925 • WWW.ALLEGHENYCOUNTY.US

Finding #2 – Election Officers Received Additional Compensation Totaling \$82,660 for Attending Training Sessions

On March 14, 2012, Governor Tom Corbett signed into law House Bill 934, which among other things, required that beginning with the November 2012 General election, all voters were required to show an “acceptable” form of photo ID to vote at the polls.

On May 1, 2014, a lawsuit was filed by the ACLU and others in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court challenging this law. Trials were held throughout the summer beginning July 25 up to September 27, 2012.

In order to fully comply with the provisions of this law - if upheld - it was decided that all Judges and Inspectors of Election attend a mandatory training session prior to the November 6, 2012 General Election. This Division notified all poll workers of their obligation to attend a mandatory “Voter ID” training and scheduled their attendance for the same. The Judges and Inspectors attending this training would be paid the usual \$20 compensation regardless of whether or not they had previously attended training in their four-year term of office.

On October 2, 2012, Judge Robert Simpson issued a partial preliminary injunction that allowed people to vote without photo ID, the same day that mandatory voter ID training classes began. In that many of the poll workers had already scheduled training, we modified the training to reflect the law’s “on hold” status and continued mandatory voter ID training to minimize confusion on Election day.

Ultimately, Commonwealth Court Judge Bernard McGinley issued a permanent injunction on January 17, 2014 to the in person voting photo ID requirement.

In conclusion, these additional payments were the result of an augmentation of election officer training due to the potential implementation of voter ID legislation.

Finding #3 – Payments Made to Polling Locations Lack Supporting Documentation

In Section 5-911.01 of the Administrative Code states “All purchases or rentals of materials, supplies, furnishings, equipment, or nonprofessional services in excess of \$30,000 shall be made pursuant to a written contract. All contracts for the purchase or rental of materials, supplies, furnishings, equipment, professional services, insurance, surety and fidelity bonds, other personal property and nonprofessional services by the County shall be in such form and include such terms as may be specified by the County Solicitor. All purchases or rentals of materials, supplies, furnishings, equipment, professional services, insurance, surety and fidelity bonds, other personal property and nonprofessional services where the cost thereof is less than \$30,000 may be made by note, memorandum, letter agreement or purchase order which shall be in such form and include such terms as may be specified by the County Solicitor.”

The transactions by the Department of Elections are well under these thresholds. However, the Department will look internally to strengthen its controls.

August 29, 2016

Page Three

Finding #4 – The Elections Division Lacks Comprehensive Policies and Procedures

I am in agreement with the audit's reference of "While the Election Officer Reference Manual and the Sure Job Aids appeared well written." As for the procedures related to the operations of the Election Department, those procedures are currently being reviewed and updated.

Conclusion: The audit makes reference to clerical errors and missing records. It's important to note these clerical error had no effect on the outcome of any Election. Rather it is a result of many hard working poll workers who at the end of a long day may have misfiled a piece of paper or two. As for some context to the amount of forms used in a typical election year. I offer the following:

- 900K voter certificates x2 =1.8 million
- 100K district register pages' x 2 = 200K
- 65K absentee ballots x2 =130K
- 130K provisional ballots primary, 65k provisional general =195K
- 360K emergency ballots x 2 =720K
- 20K absentee applications (yearly)
- Total = 3.065 million documents

Sincerely,



Jerry Tyskiewicz, Director
Department of Administrative Services

cc: Honorable Rich Fitzgerald, Allegheny County Executive
Honorable John DeFazio, President, County Council
Honorable Nicholas Futules, Vice-President, County Council
William D. McKain, Allegheny County Manager
Jennifer Liptak, Chief of Staff, Office of the County Executive
Mary C. Soroka, Director, Budget and Finance
Joe Catanese, Director of Government Relations & Constituent Services, County Council
Walter Szymanski, Director of Budget and Administration, County Council
Mark Wolosik, Manager, Elections Division